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Introduction
As the saying goes: "You may lose the battle now, but win
the war later." This seems to be an apt description of the atti-
tude of the government with respect to its special credit pro-
grams for the so-called "priority, sectors" such as small farm and
nonfarm enterprises and poor households.
The government has been waging war against poverty ever
since the Philippines gained independence in the mid-1940s.
One of the important weapons it used was credit policy, which
was aimed at moving funds as quickly as possible to the above-
mentioned target groups. Since the private commercial banking
system could not be depended upon to perform such function,
the government created several types of highly specialized fi-
nancial institutions such as rural banks and private develop-
ment banks, provided them with substantial capital subsidies,
and made them conduits of subsidized credit programs targeted
to those sectors.
The results of these efforts had been generally disappointing.
More specifically, credit subsidies went to those who did not
need them most, leaving the target beneficiaries without access
to external funds. Worse is that their repayment records were
very poor, making the credit programs unsustainable and caus-
ing the collapse of several rural and private development banks. 1
1. Th_s ss well documented in earlier studies [see Lamberte and Lira (1987) tot
an example].
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On the other hand, several informal credit institutions that did
not receive any government subsidies had done well in terms of
delivering credit to, and collecting loans from, small borrowers
who_were rationed out by the formal banking system. 2
Still, the government believes that the objective of making
credit available to those sectors in a sustainable manner can be
achievedby avoiding the mistakes of past credit programs and
revising its strategy. While it has changed the features of its
credit programs coursed through the specialized financial insti-
tutions, such as aligning the interest rates to the market rates, it
has also started to look for alternative and more effective credit
conduits. Convinced of the comparative advantage of informal
financial institutions in lending to small borrowers, the govern-
ment started to use them as credit conduits towards the second
half of the 1980s .
One of the subsets of informal financial, institutions that have
been increasingly used as credit conduits of these special credit
programs is the credit union system. 3 Credit unions mobilize
savings from, and lend funds to, their members. However, their
resources may not be sufficient to satisfy the growing credit
demands of their members. Credit unions confronted with this
problem try to solve it by asking their members to line up for
credit and by resorting to quantity credit rationing. This could
mean a big opportunity loss to those who would have wanted a
certain amount of credit at a particular time. Access to external
sources of funds such as special credit programs could relax this
resource constraint.
The major issue being raised here is whether this new strat-
egy has been effective in making credit available to the sectors
that have no access to the formal banking system without caus-
2. See for example Lamberte and Balbosa (1988) and Lamberte, Relampagos
and Graham (1990),
3. See Lamberte and Balbosa (1988) for a discussion of the criteria for determin-
irtg which institutions or activities belong to the informal financial markets.Introduction
ing problems associated with previous special credit programs.
More specifically, the question could be posed: to what extent
did it affect the performance of credit unions in terms of savings
mobilization, credit allocation and profitability? This paper at-
tempts to provide an empirical analysis of this issue.
The next chapter gives a brief sketch of the financial system in
the Philippines and a review of financial policy changes done in
the recent past. Chapter IIIdiscusses two special credit programs
of the government that explicitly use credit unions as credit con-
duits. Chapter IV analyzes the differential impact of access to
external sources of funds, suchas the special credit programs, on
the performance of credit unions. The last chapter gives a sum-
mary of the major results and makes some concluding remarks.Chapter II
Overview of the Financial System
This chapter gives an overview of the Philippine financial
system and a summary of major financial policy changes in the
recent past.
A. Composition of the Sector
Like other developing economies; the domestic financial sys-
tem of the Philippines consists of two major subsystems: the
formal and the informal. The informal financial system func-
tions outside the purview of regulations imposed by regulatory
agencies such as the Central Bank on the formal financial sys-
tem with respect to capital, reserves and liquidity requirements,
ceilings on lending and deposit rates, mandatory credit targets,
and audit and reporting requirements.
The formal financial system may be further divided into two
components, namely, the banking and nonbanking institutions.
The banking system is composed of the commercial banks, thrift
banks, rural banks, and specialized government banks. On the
other hand, nonbank financial intermediaries include insurance
companies, investment institutions, fund managers, nonbank
thrift institutions, and other financial intermediaries. All, except
insurance companies, are regulated and supervised by the Cen-
tral Bank. The Insurance Commission regulates and supervises
insurance companies.
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Table II.1 shows the assets of the various types of financial
institutions for the period 1986-92. The total nominal assets of
the sector increased by more than 100 percent during the indi-
cated period. The relative size of the financial system, which is
measured here as the ratio of the total assets of the financial
sector to GNP, declined in 1987 and 1988, but quickly turned
around in the last three years. As of 1992, total assets comprised
four-fifths of GNP, significantly higher than those of 1986 which
were only two-thirds of GNE 4
Table II.2 shows the relative sizes of the major types of finan-
cial institutions based on assets. The dominance of the banking
system in the financial sector is clearly visible. Almost four-fifths
of the total assets of the sector belongs to the banking system.
There is no indication in the recent past of any decline in the
relative size of the banking system. The dominance of the bank-
ing system in the financial system will likely remain in the me-
dium term especially with the relaxation of bank entry and
branching regulations recently adopted by the Central Bank and
the relatively successful rehabilitation of several failed banks.
The informal financial system, on the other hand, consists of
very heterogeneous group of players. Its total size is still un-
known; and there is no effort on the part of the government to
systematically gather information about them. However, results
of small sample surveys suggest that it is quite large and is a
dominant financial system, particularly in low-income urban and
rural areas. Agabin et al. (1989) attempted to estimate the size of
the informal financial markets using data from a nationwide
sample surveyconducted in 1987. The results showed that of the
estimated _P45 billion borrowing by households, 59 percent came
from the informal credit markets. The proportion of loans coming
from the informal credit markets is higher for rural areas than for
Metro Manila and other urban areas, indicating that the informal
4- The current exchange rate is P'27.60 to the dollar.Composition of the Sector
TableII.1
Assets of the Domestic Financial System, 1986-1992
(in billion pesos)
II I I Ill I
1986 1987 1988 1989 t990 1991 1992
BankingSystem 289.00 313.20 360.10 465.36 579.78 682.95 750.62
CommercialBanks 252.26 278,44 312.35 409.18 510.35 591.34 629.81
Private 164.40 179.40 224.60 296.13 365.70 406.64 419.96
Government 50.76 49.94 51.85 71.22 88.95 120.88 146.34
Foreign 37.10 49,10 35.90 41.83 55.70 63,82 61.51
Thriftbanks 17.60 19.50 24.90 32.20 37.29 47,04 59.62
Savingsand
mortgagebanks 8.10 10.60 14.20 19.60 21,72 29.63 36.35
Privatedevelopment
banks 5.60 5.40 6.70 8.35 11.18 12.17 16.83
Stocks savings and
loan associations 3.90 3.50 4.00 4.26 4.39 5.25 6.45
Ruralbanks 9.10 9.70 10.70 12.16 13.46 15.49 18.16
Specializedgovernment
banks 10.64 12,64 12.15 11.81 18.68 29.08 43.03
Nonbank financial
intermediaries 111.80 119.20 132.80 172.01 172.70 245.64 287.24
Insurancecompanies 77.49 90.10 106.10 125.63 121.47 181.70 209.15
Government 57.19 64.73 76.43 89.42 76.32 130.32 152.78
Pdvate 20.30 25.37 29.67 36.21 45.15 51.38 56.38
Investmentinstitutions 23.30 20.80 21.40 20.99 21,62 25.63 27.32
Investmenthouses 7.50 9.00 6.40 6.75 6.05 6.97 5.43
Finance companies 5.60 7.00 7.40 4.44 4,61 5.94 8,36
Investmentcompanies 10.20 4.80 5.60 9.80 10.96 12.71 13,54
Trust Operations
(Fund managers) 1,30 1.60 1.80 2.59 2.87 3.33 7.25
Other financial
intermediaries 16.41 17.64 18.69 22.80 26,74 35.18 43,52
Secudties dealers/
brokers 0.95 2.07 1.71 2.73 2.44 2.92 4.40
Pawnshops 1.01 1.32 1.67 2.17 2.66 3.45 4.37
Lending investors 0.24 0.72 0.64 1.02 1,30 2.03 2,51
Venture capitalcorp. 0.13 0,13 0.10 0.09 0,10 0,10 0.11
Specializedgov't
nonbanks 14.09 13.40 14,58 16.80 20.24 26.67 32.14THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
TABLEI1.1 (CONTINUED)
III I II I II I| I
1986 1987 1988 t989 1990 1991 1992
Nonbank thrift
institutions 1.19 1,83 2.62 3.93 4,77 5.32 6.85
Mutualbuildingandloan
association 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0,02 0.02
NonstockSLAs 1,18 1.82 2.61 3.91 4.75 5.30 6.83
Total 401.99 434.23 495,52 641.29 757.26 934.10 1044.72
Percent of GNP 67.42 64.51 62.32 70,18 70,71 74,00 76.00
Memoitem:GNP 596.28 673,13 795.16 913.84 1070.90 1262.36 1374.59
Sourceof Data:BangkoSentralngPilipinas(BSP),
credit markets play a critical role in rural areas which are not well
served by formal financial institutions. Of the total number of
sample borrowers, 66 percent borrowed from the informal finan-
cial markets. Again, the proportion of borrowers from the infor-
mal financial markets is higher for rural areas than for Metro
Manila and other urban areas. Comparing the total amount of
loans outstanding of the informal sector with that of the banking
sector, Agabin et al. (1989) found that the former was equivalent
to only 6 percent of the latter for the rural areas and 3 percent for
• the urban areas. However, if loans granted by banks to large
corporate enterprises were excluded so that only loans going to
individuals and small enterprises were considered, then total
informal loans outstanding would be about 46 percent of the total
bank loans in the case of rural areas and 14 percent in the case of
urban areas. This again shows the importance of the informal
financial markets to individuals and small enterprises especially
in rural areas.
Included in the informal financial system is the credit union
(CU) system. It is perhaps the most organized subsystem in the
informal financial system. Although on paper the newly estab-
lished Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) is supposed
to regulate and supervise credit unions, in practice it has not
8Composition of theSector
Table11.2
Distribution of Assets of the Financial System, 1986-1992
(In percent)
I I I
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Banking System 71.89 72.13 72.67 72.57 76.56 73.11 71.85
CommercialBanks 62.75 64.12 63.03 63.81 67,39 63.31 60.29
Pdvate 40.90 41.31 45.33 46.18 48.29 43.53 40.20
Government 12,63 11.50 10.46 11.11 11.75 12.94 14,20
Foreign 9.23 11.31 7.24 6.52 7.36 6.83 5.89
Thrift banks 4.38 4.49 5.03 5.02 4.92 5.04 5.71
Savingsand mortgage
banks 2.01 2.44 2.87 3.06 2.87 3.17 3.48
Pdvate development
banks 1.39 1.24 1.35 1.30 1.48 1.30 1.61
Stocks savingsand
loan associations 0.97 0.81 0.81 0.66 0.58 0.56 0.62
Ruralbanks 2.26 2.23 2,16 1.90 1.76 1.66 1.74
Specialized
government banks 2.50 2,91 2,45 1.84 2,47 3,11 4.12
Nonbankfinancial
intermediaries 27,81 27.45 26.80 26,82 22.81 26.32 27.49
Insurance companies 19,28 20.75 21,41 19.59 16.04 19,45 20.02
Government 14,23 14.91 15.42 13.94 10.08 13.95 14.62
Private 5.05 5.84 5.99 5.65 5.96 5..50 5,40
investmentinstitutions 5.80 4.79 4,32 3.27 2.86 2.74 2.62
Investmenthouses 1,87 2.07 1,70 1.05 0.80 0.75 0.52
Financecompanies 1.39 1.61 1.49 0.69 0.61 0.64 0.80
Investment
companies 2,64 1.11 1.13 1.53 1.45 1.36 1.30
Trust Operations
(Fund managers) 0.32 0,37 0.36 0,40 0.38 0,36 0.69
Other financial
intermediaries 4.08 4.06 3.77 3.56 3.53 3.77 4.17
Securities dealers/
brokers 0,24 0.48 0,34 0.42 0,32 0.31 0.42
Pawnshops 0.25 0,30 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.37 0,42
Lending investors 0.06 0.16 0.13 0,16 0.17 0.22 0.24
Venture capital corp. 0,03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0,01 0.01
Specialized gov't
nonbanks 3.50 3.09 2.94 2,62 2,67 2.86 3,08
Nonbank thrift




1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Mutualbuildingandloan
association 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nonstock SLAs 0.29 0.42 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.57 0.65
TotalAssets 100.00 100.00 100,00 100.00 100.00 100,00 100.00
Source ofData:Bangko Sentral ngPilipinas (BSP).
done so yet. More specifically, it has not imposed a minimum
capital requirement, a reserve requirement, a mandatory credit
allocation, etc., and has yet to conduct a financial audit of credit
unions. Thus, credit unions can be as flexible as informal mon-
eylenders in all aspects of their operations. Unlike deposits in
banks, deposits in credit unions are not covered by any insur-
ance. However, there has been no case in the Philippines yet of
a collapsed credit union creating a ripple effect in the credit
union system.
To date, there is no accurate count of the total number of credit
unions in the country because many have not yet registered with
the CDA. No sanctions are imposed on unregistered credit unions.
Existing studies using sample surveys have shown the phe-
nomenal growth of credit unions' assets in real terms in the 1980s. 5
They were able to weather the economic crisis that struck in the
mid-1980s better than the formal financial system. Even more in-
teresting is that credit unions depended solely on internally-gen-
erated capital to sustain operations and enhance their viability as
financial institutions, whereas many banks that received many
subsidies collapsed and had to be rehabilitated by the government.
In some areas of the country, credit unions appear to be much
larger than thrift or rural banks.
5. See Lamberte, Relampagos and Graham (1990) and Relampagos, Lamberte
and Graham (1990).
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B. Major Government Financial Policies
1. Competition Policy
Prior to the 1980s, the government adopted a policy of
"forced" financial specialization, i.e., financial institutions were
to offer only limited financial services and products. This re-
sulted in the fragmentation of the financial system and less com-
petition. The reforms initiated in the 1980s were aimed at im-
proving competition in the financial system. Thus, the policy of
"forced" specialization was abandoned by reducing functional
distinctions among various types of financial institutions so that
one group of financial institutions could effectively compete with
other groups of financial institutions. Merger and consolidation
have been encouraged so that financial institutions can exploit
economies of scale and effectively compete in the market. More
recently, bank entry and branching regulations have been re-
laxed, paving the way for more competition among various types
of financial institutions in urban and rural areas.
2. Interest Rate Policy
Although the law was de facto abolished in the early 1970s,
still the Central Bank administratively set all interest rates, up
until 1981 when it began freeing the interest rates. Interest rate
liberalization was carried out in several stages. In 1981, interest
rate ceilings on all types of deposits and loans, except those on
short-term loans, were lifted. The interest rate on short-term
loans was finally lifted in 1983.
Previously, the rediscount window was used by the Central
Bank to direct the flow of credit through banks to priority sec-
tors by giving these sectors preferential rediscount rates which
could be as low as 1 percent and a rediscounting value which
could be as high as 100 percent. This policy was changed in
1985 when the Central Bank started setting one rediscounting
value equivalent to 80 percent of the value of the original loans
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and one rediscount rate for all eligible papers which was aligned
with the market rate beginning in that year,
Credit unions have never been subjected to interest rate ceil-
ings imposed on banks. Also, they have never been given access
to the rediscounting window of the Central Bank.
3. Credit Policies
Special credit programs that carried interest rates well below
the market rates proliferated in the 1970s. Many of them had
been directly managed by the Central Bank. The political nature
of these special credit programs resulted in the diminution of the
power of the Central Bank to control credit and monetary ag-
gregates.
Towards the second half of the 1980s, the policy on special
credit programs was changed. First, the government adopted the
policy of aligrdng the interest rates on special credit programs
with the market rates. Admittedly, however, some special credit
programs, especially those that remained with certain govern-
ment agencies such as the Department of Social Services and
Welfare, still carried below-market interest rates. Second, the
funds of 20 out of the 46 agricultural credit programs were
consolidated and were now being used to beef up the existing
credit guarantee and insurance programs of the government. 6
Third, special credit programs that used to be managed by the
Central Bank were transferred to the appropriate government
financial institutions so that the Central Bank could concentrate
its efforts on the management of monetary aggregates and on
bank supervision. And fourth, specialized government financial
institutions began to concentrate on wholesale lending to exploit
economies of scale, reduce risk and av.oid competition with pri-
6. This is called the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) which i_
managed by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), an agency attached to
the Department of Agriculture_
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vate financial institutions. That is, they lent to small banks, credit
cooperatives and NGOs, which in turn lent to target beneficiaries.
4. Loan Portfolio Regulations
The government still maintains the policy of directing credit
to certain sectors of the economy as embodied in several portfo-
lio regulations. The investment-to-deposit ratio rule requires all
banks to invest and/or lend 75 percent of the total deposits
mobilized in a particular area in that same area. Another port-
folio regulation is the requirement for all banks to allocate 25
percent of their total loanable funds to agriculture/agrarian re-
form beneficiaries. The third and most recent portfolio regula-
tion is the requirement that all banks allocate 10 percent of their
loanable funds to small enterprises. Credit unions are not cov-
ered by these regulations.
5. Safehd and Soundness Regulations
The Monetary Board has placed emphasis on the stability of
financial institutions, which is why it raised the minimum capi-
tal requirement for various types of banks. Those that are al-
lowed to perform more functions have a higher minimum capi:
tal requirement than those that have fewer functions. Also, the
definition of the net worth to risk asset ratio was clarified so
that the true risk exposure of financial institutions can be easily
monitored by the authorities. An improvement was made in the
financial institutions' reporting requirements and specific guide-
lines for asset valuation and loan loss provisions to tighten, stan-
dardize and apply criteria uniformly to all banks. Credit unions
were not subjected to these regulations.
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Special Credit Programs and
Non-Bank Credit Conduits
As mentioned in the previous chapter, special credit pro-
grams proliferated in the 1970s, using the banking system as
credit conduits. Most of these had performed badly. More spe-
cifically, they were less successful in reaching their targeted ben-
eficiaries; default rates among their debtors were very high, caus-
ing the dissipation of funds and the collapse of several banks;
and they discouraged savings mobilization (Lamberte and Lim
1987). The 1983-84 economic crisis had further worsened the
situation. Even good borrowers could no longer repay their loans
because of high interest rates and the loss of demand for their
products. As shown in Table 111.1,the past due loan ratios of the
banking system remained high long after the crisis. In an effort
to clean up their bad loans, banks reduced their loan portfolio
and invested their funds in safer income earning instruments
such as Treasury bills. They could not therefore be relied upon to
deliver credit to priority sectors.
While the banking system was trying to recover from the
crisis and to adjust to a liberal policy regime initiated in the
second half of the 1980s, nonbank informal lending institutions
such as credit cooperatives and some NGOs with credit pro-
grams did well as pointed out in the earlier chapter. Their good
credit performance could be attributed to the following factors:
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Table II1.1
Past Due Ratiosof Loansof the BankingSystem
(In million pesos)
II IIBB
Bank ' 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 t991 1992
RuralBanks 36.70 31.70 29.50 26.30 25.00 23.20 24,13
Commercial Banks 23.87 13.59 9.63 7.14 6,77 9.36 5.62
PrivateDev.Banks n.a. n.a. 43.94 36.98 24.22 25.68 15.61
Specialized
GovernmentBanks n.a. n,a. 22.33 19.61 12.92 8.35 3.73
Notes: n.a - notavailable
PastDueRatios=PastDueLoans/Leans Outstanding
Amongthriftbanks, onlydataforPrivate Development Banksare
madeavailable totheresearch team,
Source:DER,Central Bank ofthePhilippines,
(1) they were mass-based and had adequate information about
the credit worthiness of their borrowers; (2) they had built-in
mechanisms for continuous savings mobilization; (3) they could
exert strong social pressure on borrowers which is important in
securing prompt repayment; and (4) most of them had very
dedicated leaders. Recognizing the problem of the banking sys-
tem and the good performance of nonbank credit institutions,
the government therefore changed its strategy of delivering credit
to priority sectors. Instead of coursing credit funds solely through
banks, the government now made use of NGOs as credit con-
duits. The following section discusses two of the special credit
programs: one for the nonagriculture sector and the other for
the agriculture sector.
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A. Tulong Sa Tao Self-Employment Loan Assistance
(TST-SELA) Program 7
The Tulong Sa Tao Self-Employment Loan Assistance (TST-
SELA) Program is a special credit program for the nonagriculture
rural sector started in April 1987. It is being implemented by the
Bureau of Small and Medium Business Development (BSMBD) of
the Department of Trade (DTI) with initial funding from the gov-
ernment of _ 30 million.
The TST-SELA is different from previous credit programs in
that it uses NGOs as conduits, instead of the banking system.
NGOs are believed to have some advantages in delivering small
credit to those who do not have access to the formal banking
system. Their long association with their clients in noncredit
services provides them with ample information on the credit risk
of clients. NGO accreditation criteria utilized by the Program
were very liberal. The Program abides by the prevailing interest
rate policy of the government by not putting a cap on the end-
user lending rate. NGOs may charge subborrowers whatever is
the prevailing commercial rate in the area. But DTI charged a
fixed 7 percent for its loans to NGOs. This gave NGOs a reason-
able spread to cover their administrative cost and credit risk
since they bear the credit risk of subloans.
The TST-SELA Program quickly became popular as can be
gathered from the number of NGOs across the country that
participated in the program. Because of this, it quickly ran out
of funds, prompting the government to tap the ADB for addi-
tional funds. This paved the way for the successor of the TST-
SELA, the NGO-Microcredit Project (MCP) I. The following are
the specific objectives of NGO-MCP I, which are basically simi-
lar to those of the TST-SELA:
7, The information here is based on the following: ADB's Appraisal of the NGO-
Microcredit Project in the philippines (November 1988); Project Completion Report of
the NGO Microcredit Project in the Philippines (June 1992); Appraisal of the Second
NGO Microcredit Project in the Philippines (October 1991); DTI's Mid-project Review:
Survey Results (July 1991); and interviews with officials of DTI-BSMBD.
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(i) to increase employment opportunities in the rural areas
for the unemployed and underemployed, particularly for
disadvantaged groups such as subsistence farmers, the land-
less and women;
(ii) to assist the poor in the formation and strengthening of
self-help groups (SHGs) to facilitate capital formation,
economies of scale, productivity, procurement and mar-
keting arrangements;
(iii) to enhance incomes and purchasing power in rural areas
to stimulate the rural economy and reduce rural-urban mi-
gration;
(iv) to encourage savings mobilization among targeted low-in-
come groups; and
(v) to strengthenNGOs as intermediaries for meeting the credit
needs of low-income borrowers with no collateral, particu-
larly in the rural areas.
The target beneficiaries of the Project were basically similar
to those of the original TST-SELA Program, i.e., microenterprises
including cottage industries, which are group-based in nature,
require modest capital, are labor-intensive, and use low technol-
ogy and local raw materials. Since this was ADB's first involve-
ment in such a project, it was decided to make it a pilot project,
limiting the number of regions to be targeted to six instead of all
the regions as in the TST-SELA Program. The six regions were
selected based upon the following criteria: high incidence of
poverty, existence of viable NGOs that would act as the credit
and technical assistance intermediaries for the target groups un-
der the Project, and equitable geographical distribution.
Under the NGO-MCP I, the scope of the TST-SELA Program
was expanded to all sectors, i.e., agroprocessing, manufactur-
ing, cottage, handicraft, trade, transport and services, excluding
agricultural production, since there were already credit programs
supporting this activity. It emPhasized lending to self-help groups
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in preference to individuals. The intermediary NGOs would of-
fer the beneficiaries a package of services including general ca-
pacity-building of beneficiary self-help groups, assistance in the
institution of savings schemes, technical and project manage-
ment training, and services related to procurement and market-
ing. The TST-SELA Program would delegate decision making to
the regional level; as well as make possible NGO representation
in the national and regional policy and decision making bodies
of the Program.
Approval of the subsidiary loans to the NGOs was facilitated
by the establishment of Provincial Fund Management Commit-
tees (PFMCs) with a loan approval authority of less than
t_150,000 and Regional Fund Management Committees (RFMCs)
with a loan approval authority of from _150,000 to 1_500,000.
The Committees were comprised of the Regional Director of DTI
for RFMC or Provincial Director of DTI for PFMC, a representa-
tive of the local banking community and a representative of a
local NGO network. DTI hired 76 financial analysts who pro-
cessed the loan applications of NGOs.
Only NGOs including credit unions that met the required
accreditation criteria were qualified to participate in the Project,
thus effectively screening out weak NGOs. DTI evaluated, se-
lected and accredited NGOs according to the following criteria:
(a) Institutional Criteria
(i) They should be registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission or with the Bureau of Coopera-
tives Development or with such other regulatory body
or agency as may be decided upon by the govern-
ment and the ADB;
(ii) Their management board should consist of members
of high standing in the local community;
(iii) They should have at least one year experience in com-
munity development for income-generating projects
for low-income groups, with rural coverage;
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(iv) They should have a minimum staff beneficiary-group
ratio of 1:20;
(v) They should have provisions for periodic staff train-
ing programs; and
(vi) They should have at least 20 square meters of office
space.
(b) Financial Criteria
(i) They should have externally audited financial state-
ments;
(ii) They should have a minimum net worth of _ 100,000;
and
(iii) They should have a net worth to risk asset ratio of
not less than 1:5.
(c) Lending Performance
(i) They should have had experience in lending for at least
one year;
(ii) They should have a collection-rate performance of over
80 percent, and a past due ratio of not more than 15
percent of total loan portfolio;
(iii) They should have a record of cost per job created of
generally not more than _ 15,000; and
(iv) They will provide at least 15 percent of the financing
for each subproject.
Processing and approval of subloans to final beneficiaries were
the responsibility of participating NGOs. However, NGOs had to
follow the following criteria imposed by DTI in approving loans:
(a) The subborrower/s should belong to a low-income cat-
egory;
(b) The subborrower/s should preferably belong to a disad-
vantaged segment of the population such as the landless,
subsistence farmers, the physically handicapped or women;
(c) The subborrower/s should preferably be a self-help
group/s;
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(d) The subborrower/s should preferably be a resident of the
municipality where the subproject is to be undertaken; and
(e) The subborrower/s should submit a subproject proposal
that meets the following requirements:
(i) the subloan request could be up to I_25,000 for an
individual beneficiary or up to'P200,000 for a group-
based beneficiary;
(ii) the subborrower will provide at least 10 percent of
the cost of the subproject in cash, kind or labor;
(iii) the subproject will be viable on the basis of technical,
financial, managerial and marketing considerations,
and will particularly detail its procurement and mar-
keting arrangements;
(iv) cash inflows from the operation of the subproject
would, after meeting obligatory cash outflows, gener-
ally provide a cover for debt-service equal to a mini-
mum of 1.2 times the required amortization;
(v) the return on investment or financial internal rate of"
return of the subproject will generally be over 20 per-
cent per annum;
(vi) the subproject will be labor intensive and utilize local
raw materials;
(vii) the cost per job created, both directly and indirectly,
under the subproject will generally not exceed
P 15,000; and
(viii) the subproject will provide for savings mobilization
of at least 5 percent of the value of the loan during the
period of amortization, in parallel with periodic re-
payments.
Accredited NGOs may onlend to beneficiaries through smaller
NGOs which are not accredited.
Accredited NGOs were eligible for lines of credit up to a maxi-
mum of _2 million at a time for onlending. Repayment periods of
NGO loans may not exceed five years inclusive of a grace period.
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Microenterprises and cottage industries, either owned by in-
dividuals or self-help groups,inrural areasmay qualify forthis
credit program.Subloanstoindividual borrowerswould be made
in amounts of up to"P 25,000at an annual interest ratenot ex-
ceedingthecommercialbank interest rateprevailing in thearea,
with fixedrepayment periodsof up to two years. On the other
hand, subloanstoself-help groups would be made inamounts of
up toP_200,000, atan annualinterest rate not exceedingthecom-
mercialbank interest rate in thearea, with fixed repayment peri-
ods of up to fiveyears. Itisto be noted thatcommercial bank
.interest rates aremarket-determined. Final subborrowersmay use
the loan forbusinessexpansionor start-up business. The NGO
and the final subborrowerswould executean onlending agree-
ment upon approvalof the subloan, which the NGO can use in
any legal action toenforcecomplianceofsubborrowerswith the
terms of such agreement.
The Project became operational in April1989 and was com-
pletedin August 1991,15 months ahead ofschedulebecausethe
NGOs were abletodisburse all thefunds tosubborrowers.Ben-
eficiaries of the projects came to278 NGOs, of which 60 percent
were creditcooperatives, that onlent funds to 21,100 micro-
enterprises and self-help groups.The sizeof the loansto NGOs
averaged P'775,000 while loans to final beneficiaries averaged
P'11,000. The geographicdistribution of subloans is shown in
Table III.2. The project finalbeneficiaries were mostly of the
"nonbankable"typeswithlimited mortgageable assets and house-
hold income of below P2,500. Accordingly, the loan from the
Project was able to increase the beneficiaries' income by any-
where from 50 percent to 200 percent.
The pastdue loansofNGOs withtheProgram were estimated
at 15 percentand the default rateat2 percent. Default rates of
subsidiary loanswere more orless thesame. Accordingly, credit
cooperatives have a better repayment recordthan othertypesof
NGOs becauseoftheir longexperience inlendingand credit col-
lection. Most of them strived hard to repay their Program loans
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TST-SEI.NNGO-MCP APPROVALS BYREGION
As of December31, 1993
TST-SELA No.of NGO-MCP No.of NGO-MCPI1 No.of Amount No.of
REGION Amount NGOS Amount NGOs Amount NGOs Approved NGOs
I 16,740.000 38 1I, 300,000 27 28,040.000 65
CAR 12,791,000 30 7,620.000 16 20.410,000 46
II 24.660,000 31 36,300.000 46 60,960,000 77
;II 3.130,000 11 60,875.000 53 41,080,000 47 105,090.000 111
IV' 10,540,000 24 65,910,000 73 76,450,000 97
V 2,470,000 11 18,883,000 59 15,400,000 53 36,750,000 123
',,4 3,890,000 13 4,390,000 5 8,280,000 18
VII 5,580,000 19 24,903,000 45 35,390,000 61 65,870,000 125
VIII 2,900,000 8 33,303,731 39 26,570,000 34 62,310,000 81
IX 15,870,000 55 17,620,000 41 3,490,000 96
X 3,540,000 8 28,429,000 42 26,180,000 46 58,150,000 96
X] 3,300,000 12 41,225,700 55 19,070,000 28 63,650,000 95
XII 7,370,000 17 10,010,000 10 17,380,000 27
NCR 15,070,000 15 22,000,000 18 37,070,000 33
TOTAL 121,191,000 278 207,619,431 295 51,956,000 75 380,766,431 648
Note:CAR - Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Source: Bureau ofSmall &Medium Business Development.
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promptly and to maintain their good credit track record even if
some of their subloans were already past due.
The loan collection rate of NGOs from their borrowers aver-
aged 81 percent. Of course, this variedby region from a low of 67
percent to a high of 92 percent. Regions struck by natural calami-
ties, such as devastating typhoons and the eruption of Mr. Pinatubo,
experienced lower collection rates. NGOs restructured loans in
these areas but did not yet feel the need to write them off. Again,
credit cooperatives showed a better collection rate than other types
of NGOs.
While NGOs paid DTI 7 percent on subsidiary loans, they
charged final beneficiaries for their loans an average of 18 percent
per annum., leaving them a spread of 11 percentage points. This
was more than enough to cover their administrative costs in han-
dling small loans and the risk involved in lending to "nonbankable"
borrowers.
Encouraged by the success of the first program, the govern-
ment requested ADB for another assistance to the TST-SELA Pro-
gram. ADB responded favorably to this request by providing the
government with another loan of $35 million with the same terms
as in the previous project. This project was prepared with the
active involvement of NGOs and beneficiaries of the previous
project.
The features of the NGO-MCP I were carried over tothe NGO-
MCP II with some modifications to improve further the perfor-
mance of the project. First, in terms of regional coverage, the NGO-
MCP II now included all regions of the country. Second, the ac-
creditation criteria for participating NGOs were revised to allow
NGOs in remote areas of the country to participate in the project.
Third, the requirement that at least 80 percent of the loans be
used to finance manufacturing activities was eliminated so long
as they were not used for agricultural activities. Fourth, DTI's lend-
ing rate to NGOs was increased to 12 percent per annum, allow-
ing the government to cover its costs related to foreign exchange
risk, DTI's administrative overheads and provisions for loan losses.
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Fifth, a surcharge of 2 percent on top of the onlending rate to final
beneficiaries was levied to establish the capital-buildup fund for
the microenterprises.
The NGO-MCP II started in April 1992. As of December 31,
1993, DTI had already approved the loan applications of 589 NGOs
with a total value of P'352 million. Again, credit cooperatives com-
prised about 60 percent of the total number of NGO-beneficiaries.
Assuming a loan of I_25,000 for each beneficiary, then this second
project must have benefited at least 14,000 borrowers.
The TST-SELA and the NGO-MCP I were aggressively pro-
moted by DTI-BSMBD. In'some cases, the DTI-BSMBD itself even
went to the extent of preparing a feasibility study for the NGO so
that the latter could participate in the program. Many credit co-
operatives at first did not find the need for external assistance.
Those who availed themselves of the credit program eventually
realized the need for it. Others who learned about the program
also wanted to participate in it. Thus, DTI-BSMDB no longer felt
the need to aggressively promote the program. In fact, because
the program had by then generated numerous applicants, DTI-
BSMDB tightened a bit its criteria by lending only to NGOs with a
good track record which included having been in existence for at
least three years and having a successful lending program in place
for at least one year.
B. The Development Assistance Program for Cooperatives and
People's Organization (DAPCOPO) 8
The Development Assistance Program for Cooperatives and
People's Organization (DAPCOPO) is a special credit program
for the agriculture sector with practically the same rationale and
major features as the TST-TELA. It was established in May 1990
by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) using the funds
of the CALF mentioned in the previous chapter. Its objectives are:
8. This is largely based on Alip et al, (1990).
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1. To provide credit assistance to agriculture-based groups
and/or projects that are not serviced by banks by channel-
ing funds via existing federations of cooperatives and
people's organizations or networks of NGOs.
2. To assist the federations of cooperatives and people's orga-
nizations and NGO networks in building up their capa-
bilities as financial-intermediation institutions.
3. To develop and strengthen viable rural community-based
organizations that can perform and/or facilitate credit de-
livery and savings mobilization in the countryside.
4. To encourage the development of linkages among commu-
nity-based groups and banking institutions.
The program has three components, namely: (1) the credit
component which addresses the credit needs of the nonbankable
farmers' groups and their members; (2) the institution-building
component which provides financial assistance to farmers' groups
for their capability-building efforts; and (3) the savings mobiliza-
tion component which encourages beneficiaries to increase their
savings and to link up with banking institutions.
Unlike the TST-SELA which deals directly with primary co-
operatives, DAPCOPO deals only with federations which, in
turn, lend to their member primary cooperatives, which, in turn,
lend to their members. The federations are to assume the credit
risk. However, only those that meet the following criteria can
gain access to assistance by DAPCOPO:
1. Federations should have proven management capability
to undertake group lending activities (i.e., a satisfactory
lending track record of at least three years).
2. Federations should have savings mobiliT.ation/capital for-
mation programs.
3. Federations should have counterpart operating and loan
funds and capital accounts (equity) equivalent to the
proposed loan from the program.
26Cooperativesand People'sOrga_lization
A comraittee composed of representatives from the coopera-
tive and NGO community sector, the Land Bank of the Philip-
pines and the Agricultural CreditPolicyCouncil screensand
accredits eligible cooperatives.
DAPCOPO's loans to federations could be as long as five
yearswith interest rate pegged atthe prevailing rediscount rate
of I.andBank on its loanstobanks.Sincethestart of theproject,
the rediscount rateof Land Bank has ranged between 11 per-
centand 15 percent. There isno cap on theinterest rateon sub-
loans. Accordingly, interest rates on final borrowersranged from
18 percent to 21 percent. To realize the objective of savings
mobilization, the federations were requiredto put up a deposit
fund equivalent to15 percent of therequested loanfund.
Table III.3 givesa summary of the accomplishments of the
program asofDecember 1993. Fourteenfederations availed them-
selvesof the program, of which four operateon a nationwide
basis and tenon a regionwidebasis. The program granted_24.1
million in loansto thesefederations, benefiting 119 primary co-
operatives and 10,551individual borrowers. Ithad a repayment
rateof 97 percentat the federation leveland of 100 percentat
the program level because, as mentioned earlier, federations as-
sumed the creditrisk. Savings generated by the federations
amounted toonlyI_2.2 million.
The programs discussedabove are justtwo of the special
credit programs using NGOs includingcredit cooperatives as
conduitsthathave recently proliferated. Other credit programs
with features similar to the two arethosefunded by the Tech-
nology and Livelihood ResourceCenter (TLRC),theSocial Secu-
rity System (SSS), the Government Social Insurance System (GSIS),
and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Aside from
these, primary credit cooperatives have access to external funds
through the central liquidity fund or interlending scheme estab-
lished by some federations such as NAMVESCO and PFCCO,
and through some large NGOs such as the Philippine Business
for Social Progress (PBSP).
27TABLE1tl.3
Oevelopment Assistance Program for Cooperatives and People's Organizations
(DAPCOPO)
Accomplishment Report
As of December 31, 19fl3
No.of No. of Repayment Repayment
Federation Service Loans Loans Primary • ind. Rate on Rate on Savings
Area Granted Generated Benefl- Benefi- • Fed. Program Generated
(in M P) ciaries ¢iaries Level I Level2 (Federations)
1. FFFCI Nationwide 5.00 9,657,132.00 8 2,875 100% 100% 581,124.94
2. KASAMA RegioniV 1.00 2,433,550.85 15 487 82% 100% 432,709.51
3. PFCC1 Nationwide 1.40 2,177,679.00 9 345 100% 100% 108,833.95
4. CECt Nationwide 1.20 1,730,000.00 8 2,666 148% 100% 51,090.00
5. NORLU Regi(_ I& II 1.50 1,275,500.00 15 352 75% 100% 9,837.50
6. DAFENACO RegionXI 1.00 1,303,620.57 9 1,087 100% 46,499.28
7. MASS- RegionX,
SPECC ,Y3, &Xll 3.00 1,130,000.00 4 493 100% 100% nd
8. CFPI Nationwide 1.50 486,000.00 13 402 92% 100% 144,030.00
9. TAGCODEC RegionIII&IV 2.00 2,250,000.00 11 1,140 60% 100% 502,500.00
10. VICTO RegionVII 1.50 2,050,000.00 6 98 100% 100% nd
11. MASNAMARCO Regk:)nII ZOO 2,986,051.62 9 105 100% 100% 300,000.00
12. BCDC Region V 1.00 400,000.00 4 nd 75% t00% nd
13. AFCCUt RegionVl 1.00 588,000.00 8 268 100% 100% 18,000.05
t4. CAVALCO* ReGionII 1.00
TOTAL 24.10 28,467,534.04 119 10,551 97% 100% 2,194,625.18
Note: 1RepaymentfromPrimariestoFederation
• - Newly released loan 2Rep_yrl_gnt fl'om FederationtoProgram
nd- nodataChapter IV
Access to External Sources of Funds
and the Performance of Credit Unions
The major testable hypothesis of this study is that access to
external funds can have a differential impact on the credit unions'
performance as measured in terms of certain quantitative indica-
tors, such as extent of savings mobilization, loan allocation, prof-
itability, etc., and some qualitative indicators such as management
policies and style. This hypothesis is tested using data from a sample
of credit unions.
A. The Sample Credit Unions 9
The choice of the sample credit unions 1° used in this study
was based on the survey of credit cooperatives affiliated with the
Philippine Federation of Credit Cooperatives (PFCCO) and the
National Market Vendors Credit Cooperatives (NAMVESCO)con-
ducted by Pragma Corporation between 15 November and 12
December in 1993 using a structured interview schedule. The
sample consisted of 100 credit cooperatives affiliated with PFCCO
9. This is based on the Survey Quality Control Manual and Software Design by
the Pragma Corporation which administered the survey.
10. The terms "credit unions" and "credit cooperatives" will be used interchange-
ably in this study.
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and 30 with NAMVESCO. Both federations operated on a na-
tionwide basis.
Nine out of 15 administrative regions in the country were se-
lected as sampling universe since these regions have the largest
concentration of PFCCO- and NAMVESCO-affiliated cooperatives.
These are Regions II, III, IV, V, VII, X, XI, XII, and the National
Capital Region (NCR). Affiliate d cooperatives with assets of _2.5
million and above were all included in the sample. The rest of the
sample was drawn from the sampling universe using simple ran-
dom sampling.
Aside from answering the questionnaire, the respondents (i.e.,
managers and/or treasurers of the sample credit unions) were
also requested to submit financial reports for the years 1990, 1991
and 1992. This study utilized the information contained in these
reports, except those pertaining to loan delinquency and credit
union membership which were based on the questionnaire.
Although all the sample credit unions had been in existence
for more than three years, the analysis of their performance was
limited to the years 1990-92 for which data were available. 11
Upon inspection of the returns, it was found out that 25 credit
unions did not submit complete financial reports, especially those
pertaining to 1990 and 1991. Since this study intended to ana-
lyze the performance of credit unions in the period 1990-92, it
was therefore decided to drop from the sample credit unions
those with incomplete financial reports. Thus, the sample size
used in this study was reduced to 105.
The next step was done to identify credit unions that either
had or did not have outstanding loans payable or borrowings by
examining the individual balance sheets. Credit unions that had
outstanding loans payable in any one year during the period
1990-92 were classified under the first group. This was further
11. Longer years would create more problems since a large number of credit
unions, especially those located in rural areas, do not keep realiable records of their
financial reports.
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subdivided into two groups, namely: those with outstanding
loans from the TST-SELA Program and those with outstanding
loans from sources other than the TST-SELA Program. The TST-
SELA Program was distinguished from the credit unions' other
sources of borrowing because it was the largest government-
sponsored credit program in terms of area coverage and finan-
cial resources with financial support from a multilateral institu-
tion that used credit unions as credit conduits. The Program is
expected to have a differential impact on the performance of
credit unions with access to external funds. 12
A great majority of the sample credit unions did not specify
in their balance sheets the sources of borrowing. Thus, a list of
TST-SELA borrowers was secured from the DTI-BSMBD, and
this was used to identify from the sample credit unions those
that borrowed from the TST-SELA Program. The list of credit
unions with approved loans from the TST-SELA Program in-
cluded in the sample is shown in Table IV.1. The 31 Credit unions
came from nine regions of the country. The most recent loans
they obtained from the TST-SELA Program ranged from _150,000
to _2 million. On examining the balance sheets, it appeared that
some credit unions that borrowed from the TST-SELA Program
also borrowed funds from other sources. However, in most
cases, the amounts borrowed from the TST-SELA were much
larger than those borrowed from other sources.
The 105 sample credit unions were distributed as follows.
Group I: with borrowings from TST-SELA Program - 31; Group
II: with borrowings from other sources - 35; and Group III:
without any borrowings - 39.
The information culled from the financial reports was supple-
rnented by personal interviews with the managers of five credit
unions included in the sample: two each from Groups I and III
and one from Group II.
12. Only two of the total samples have been fdentified to have borrowed from the
DAPCOPO.
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Credit Unionswith Approved Loansfrom TST.SELA
I fill LI
Date Amount
Approved Approved (P) Province Region
65 June 4, 1992 67,500 Isabela II
11 July2, 1992 1,000,000 Pampanga III
67 May 6, 1993 2,000,000 Bulacan III
97 March30, 1993 500,000 Batangas IV
7 June 3, 1993 2,000,000 Para_iaqueArea II NCR
77 Feb. 5, 1993 1,000,000 ManilaArea I NCR
122 Oct.6, 1992 700,000 Davao del Sur X]
121 March2, 1993 2,000,000 Daval del Sur X]
55 April21, 1992 500,000 Misamis Oriental X
87 Oct. 22, 1992 150,000 Camarines Sur V
65 Oct. 9, 1989 1,500,000 Bulacan III
Nov. 16, 1990 1,000,000
10 July25, 1990 1,500,000 Bulacan iii
68 Oct. 12, 1990 1,000,000 Bulacan III
88 Feb. 21, 1990 150,000 Camadnes Sur V
94 April30, 1991 150,000 Camarines Sur V
25 Dec. 10,1990 500,000 Negros Oriental VII
52 Dec. 15, 1989 700,000 Camiguin V
54 July 17, 1989 - 765,000 Isabela ii
Aug. 22, 1990 470,000
19 Oct.23, 1989 1,000,000 Isabela II
March8, 1991 1,000,000
84 Jan. 16, 1991 500,000 Isabela II
20 July3, 1991 400,000 Isabela II
112 July 5, 1988 350,000 NCR NCR
Nov.25, 1989 500,000
27 May31,1989 1,000,000 NCR NCR
30 Jan. 11, 1990 2,000,000 NCR NCR
50 Oct. 19, 1988 1,000,000 Misamis Oriental X
44 Oct. 12, 1990 2,000,000 NCR NCR
131 May6, 1993 2,000,000 Rizal ,IV
127 July 13, 1993 2,000,000 Quezon IV
53 Dec. 21, 1992 150,000 Agusandel Node X
21 Nov.28, 1990 250,000 Negros Oriental VII
64 March14, 1989 500,000 IlocosSur I
Aug. 22, 1990 1,750,000
i
Average- 1,118,065
Note: Thosewhohaverecently approved loanshadloansunder the
previous programs. .
Source: DTI-BSMBD.
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B. Methods of Data Analysis
It would have been ideal to have a pre-test, post-test experi-
mental-controlled group design to test the hypothesis of this
study if it were not for data constraint. Given this data con-
straint, the study used the post-test experimental-control group
design. The limitations of this design are well known and should
be taken into account in interpreting the results.
The study mainly conducted tests of differences of means of
particular variables among the three groups noted above. Be-
fore this procedure was applied, a test was performed to deter-
mine whether the data were normally distributed. 13 The results
showed that data for almost all variables were not normally
distributed, suggesting that the characteristics of the sample can
be better represented by the median values instead of the means.
As regards the testing for the differences of the characteristics of
the three groups, the nonparamentric Kruskal-Wallis one-way
analysis of variance was deemed a more appropriate test proce-
dure than the parametric one-way Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA). Nevertheless, just for purposes of comparing results,
the parametric one-way ANOVA was also applied to test for
differences in the characteristics of these three groups. 14Duncan's
multiple-range test was used to determine which of the three
population means were different from each other. The results of
the two statistical test procedures _e the same in most cases.
C. Economic Status of Members of Credit Unions
Before presenting the results of the empiricai analyses, it would
be worthwhile to make a deviation by briefly discussing the gen-
eral economic status of credit union members because of its rel-
evance to the concluding remarks to be made in the next chapter.
13, The PROC UNIVAPAATE of the SAS package was u_e¢_/or thi&
14. Since the number of obsefvatiot_ was unbalan_ the PROC GLM for Unbal-
anced Anova of the SAS package was used
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The survey on which the data of this study were based did
not gather information about the economic characteristics of
members of the sample credit unions. However, the results of
fairly recent studies on credit unions that included in the sample
credit unions affiliated with the PFCCO and NAMVESCO can
probably give a rough idea of the economic status of the mem-
bers of the credit unions being studied. The study by Relampagos,
Lamberte and Graham (1990) which made use of data collected
from 227 individual members drawn randomly from some 30,000
members of PFCCO-affiliated credit unions found that a large
majority of the sample were made up of wage earners whose
average annual income from occupation was slightly more than
the national average family income from main occupation. The
average current 'annual expenditures comprised 60 percent of
the average current annual income, suggesting a substantial sav-
ings potential among credit union members.
Almost all of the respondents were borrowers from their
credit unions. Aside from the credit unions, some of them also
availed themselves of the services of banks. Forty percent of the
respondents had deposits with banks. However, only 5 percent
were able to borrow from banks.
With respect to NAMVESCO, Lamberte and Balbosa (1988)
conducted a survey of 82 credit union members, of which 50
were members of NAMVESCO-affiliated credit unions. Mem-
bers of the credit unions were mostly self-employed who ran
their own business. This was to be expected because
NAMVESCO-affiliated credit unions operated in public markets
and mainly catered to market vendors. They were relatively
well-off with annual per capita income more than twice the
estimated national per capita income. Their average annual family
expenditures were about half their total annual family income,
suggesting that they were, on the average, net savers.
Fifty-six (56) percent of the sample had deposits with banks.
However, only 4 of the 82 respondents were able to borrow from
a bank. Almost all of them borrowed from their credit unions.
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In general, the two studies showed that credit union mem-
bers belonged to households with above-average standard of
living measured in terms of income, residential status and ameni-
ties consumed. Still, they had very little access to credit from the
formal banking system. This forced most of them to join a credit
• union.
D. Performance of Credit Unions
In the analyses that follow, the differences in the characteris-
tics of the three groups mentioned above will be tested for the
years 1990, 1991 and I992.
1. Size of the Credit Unions
The size of the sample credit unions may be measured in
terms of the number of members and total assets. One hypoth-
esis here is that access to external sources of funds by credit
unions might have attracted more people to join the credit union
to appropriate for themselves the benefits from such privilege.
Thus, credit unions that have access to external funds are likely
to have more members than those without such access. Also,
they are likely to have a higher proportion of active members to
total number of members for the same reason mentioned above, is
Another hypothesis is that external funds might have con-
tributed significantly to the financing of the assets of credit unions.
That is, access to external funds might have accounted mainly
for the growth of the assets of credit unions.
A great majority of the sample credit unions gave informa-
tion on the number of members in 1992 but not in previous
years. Upon inspection of those credit unions that gave such
15. It is possible that a credit union that has access to special credit programs has
stopped recruiting new members to limit the gains from such programs to existing
members. However, the results of our interviews with three credit unions that needed
credit support this.
35EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FUNDS AND CREDIT UNIONS
information for the previous years, it was observed that the
number of members did not differ so much in those three years.
Thus, for purposes of the subsequent analyses, it might be safe
to use the same number of credit union members for the period
1990-92 for those that have incomplete information.
The three groups had, on the average, less than one thou-
sand members (Table W.2). In 1992, Group II obtained the high-
est average number of members, closely followed by Group I.
However, the differences in the average number of members
among the three groups were not statistically significant.
A large proportion of the members of the three groups Of
credit unions remained active, i.e., they made at least one trans-
action with their credit unions within a year. However, such
activeness varied across the three groups, and the differences
are statistically significant. Group III consistently showed the
highest proportion of active members to total members, while
Group II had the lowest proportion of such members.
The average assets of the three groups in 1990 came to about
_3 million. They all achieved considerable growth in assets in
subsequent years. Group II appeared to be the fastest growing
group of credit unions despite the fact that it had the lowest
proportion of active members to total members. In 1992, Group
II's average assets amounted to 6.6 million, followed by Group I
with _5.2 million and Group III with _4.3 million. However,
differences in the average assets of the three groups were not
statistically significant.
The assets per member gave an indication of the resources
available to each member of the credit union. In 1990, the aver-
age assets per member ranged from four to five thousand pesos.
These increased over the next two years, with Group II realizing
the highest growth rate. In 1992, the differences in the average
assets per member became statistically significant. Group III had
the lowest assets per member at P5.7 thousand compared with
Groups I and II which had P8.4 thousand and P9.6 thousand,
respectively.
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Part of the assets of Groups I and II had been financed by
external borrowings. Without such financing, these two groups
might have shown much lower assets than Group III. This is
true for Group I in all the years and for Group II in 1990 as
shown in Table W.2. Still, the average assets adjusted for bor-
rowings of the three groups were not statistically different from
TableIV.2
Indicators of the Size of the Credit Unions (Median)




1. TST-SELAI 750.0 750.0 750.0
2. Others (11) 794.5 710.0 754.5
B. WlO borrowings (111) 676.5 670.0 683.0
It %ofActiveMembers
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 80.0* 80.0* 80.0*
2. Others (11) 70.7* 79.1" 73.0 °
B. W/Oborrowings Off) 9_5" 96.1 ° 96.1"
IE AverageTotalAssets (P)
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 3,013,656.0 3,827,956.0 5,199,545.0
2. Othem(11) 2,947,011.3 4,233,180.6 6,602,189.7
B. WlOborrowings Off) 2,721,624.0 3,226,382.1 4,261,714.4
IV. AssetPerMember (P)
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA(I) 4,916.0 6,231.2 8,365.3*
2. Olhers(11) 4,268.7 5,769.3 9,586.8 °
B. W/Oborrowings (111) 3,861.6 4,661.4 5,6_0.1"
V. AverageTotalAssetsAdjusted forBorrowings (P)
A. W'dh I>_rowings
1. TST-SELA(I) 2,052,254.0 2,937,662.0 3,g27,265.0
2, Others (11) 2,584,428.0 4,199.693.0 4,783,837.4
B. W/O bonowiags (111) 2,721,624.0 3,226,382.1 4,261,714.4
*TheChi-Square statistic issigni_cant atthe10%level.
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each-other. Also, assets of Groups I and II had consistently in-
creased during the period in question, implying that access to
external sources of funds cannot fully explain the growth in
assets realized by these credit unions.
2. Sources of Funds
Credit unions have five possible sources of funds to finance
their activities, namely: share capital, retained earnings booked as
reserves, savings deposits, time deposits and borrowings from vari-
ous sources. The hypothesis here is that access to external funds
has undermined the savings mobilization efforts of credit unions.
(i) Loans Payable/Borrowing
Table IV.3 shows the average outstanding loans payable or
borrowings of Groups I and II. The average outstanding loans
payable of Group I increased to about 1D1million in 1991 but
declined to P779 thousand in the following year. On the other
hand, Group II's average loans outstanding payable increased
fivefold during the period 1990-92 from _40 thousand to _200
thousand. Still, these were significantly lower than those of
Group I. It is to be noted that the TST-SELA Program lent up to
P2 million per credit union, whereas other programs had much
lower loan ceilings. As shown in Table IV.l, credit unions' bor-
rowings from the TST-SELA Program averaged P'1.1 million.
On a per member basis, Group I still had significantly higher
average borrowings than Group II in all the years considered.
In 1992, the average outstanding borrowing per member was
P1,894 for Group I and P205 for Group II.
The proportion of borrowings to total resources (i.e., liabili-
ties plus share capital and reserves = total assets) gives an idea
of the degree of dependence of credit unions on borrowings as
sources of funds. Such dependence can be observed to have
increased rapidly for both groups in 1991, but the increase ta-
pered off in 1992. Group I had a significantly higher proportion
38Performance of Credit Unions
TableW.3
Outstanding LoansPayable/Borrowings(Median)




1. TST-SELA I 675,000.0" 1,100,000.0" 779,167.0"
2. Others(11) 40,000.0" 146,690.3" 200,000.0"
B. W/Oborrowings Off) 0.0 0.0 0.0
L %ofTotalResources
A, Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 13.6" 21.2" 22.6*
2. Others (11) 1.3" 3.1" 3.4"
B. W/Oborrowings (111) 0.0 0.0 0.0
m LoansPayable perMember(P)
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 941.4" 1125.8" 1893.7"
2. Others (11) 54.6* 172.8" 205.0"
B. WIOborrowings Off) 0.0 0.0 0,0
*TheChi-Square statistic issignificant atthe10%level.
of borrowings to total resources than Group II in all the years
considered, implying that the former was more dependent on
borrowings as a source of funds than the latter.
The findings above strongly justified our decision to divide
credit unions that have access to external funds into two groups.
(ii) Savings Deposits
In 1990, only 11 out of 105 credit unions did not offer a
savings deposits facility. This went down to 10 in 1991 and to 8
in 1992, suggesting that savings deposits were soon to become a
universal financial instrument offered by the sample credit unions
to their members. It is to be noted that offering a savings deposit
instrument to members increased a credit union's transaction
costs since it required that members be serviced whenever they
made a deposit or a withdrawal of deposits.
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The average outstanding deposits of the three groups were
on the rise during the period under study (Group IV.4). Group
I had the fastest growth in savings deposits, followed by Group
II. As of 1992, savings deposits averaged I_0.7 million for Groups
I and II and 1_0.4 million for Group III. However, the differences
in the average savings deposits among the three groups were
not statistically significant.
With respect to the contribution of each credit union mem-
ber to savings deposits, an increasing trend can be seen. Group
III had the most sluggish growth in savings deposits per member
among the three groups. In 1992, the average savings deposits
per member of Groups I, II and III stood at _1.1 thousand, _1.0
thousand, and _0.7 thousand, respectively. It is to be noted,
however, that these averages were not significantly different
from each other.
The differences in the average proportion of savings deposits
to the total resources among the three groups were not statisti-
cally significant. In 1992, they ranged from 10 percent to 14 per-
cent. There was no definite pattern of increasing dependence of
credit unions on this source of funds during the period in review.
The results clearly showed that access to external funds did
not have a differential impact on the three types of credit unions
as far as mobilization of savings deposits was concerned.
(iii) Time Deposits
The time deposit instrument had not yet been widely offered
by credit unions to their members. Out of 105 credit unions, 76
did not have time deposits in 1990. This number went down to
70 in 1991, and to 65 in 1992. Indeed, there had been a definite
trend towards offering this instrument as an alternative source
of funds of credit unions and as an alternative investment in-
strument for members of credit unions.
Table IV.5 shows that the median time deposit was zero for
all groups. However, a closer look at those credit unions that
already offered time deposits showed the importance of this
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Ta_PL.4
i_ivinos Deposits (l_lan)
illlli II II I I i i
1900 1901 1992
L AverageSavings Deposits (P)
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELAI 238,526.0 499,528.0 731,336.0
2. Others (11) 200,152.2 2,531,150.0 683,604.9
B. WlOborrowings (111) 356,026.4 422,680.0 440,894.1
it %ofTotatResources
A. Withbon-owings
1. TST-SELA (I) 8.1 12.2 12.9
2. Others (11) 14.3 10.5 14.0
B. W/Oborrowings (IU) 12.1 11.4 10.0
lit Savings Deposit perMember (P)
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 322.6 637.0 1,103.7
2. Others(11) 433.8 500.8 1,006.8
B. W/Oborrowings (111) 550.7 592.5 713.4
*TheChi-Square statistic issignificant atthe10%level.
instrument as a source of funds. In 1992, such deposits averaged
P1.4 million for the 14 credit unions belonging to Group I and
the 12 credit unions belonging to Group II, and 1"1.2 million for
the 14 credit unions belonging to Group III. These comprised
approximately 10 percent of the total resources of the three
groups.
(iv) Share Capital
Share capital or fixed deposit remained the most important
source of funds for credit unions. It is to be noted that the ceiling
for an individual regular loan was usually based only on the
amount of share capital which a member had with the credit
union. Thus, those who wished to borrow more had to increase
their share capital.
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Table IV.5
Time Deposits (Median)




1. TST-SELA (I) 0 0 0
2. Others (11) 0 0 0
B. W/Oborrowings (111) 0 0 0
IL %ofTotalResources
A, Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 0 0 0
2. Others (11) 0 0 0
B. WlOborrowings (111) 0 0 0
| TimeDeposits perMember (P)
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 0 0 0
2. Others (11) 0 0 0
B. W/Oborrowings (111) 0 0 0
*TheChi-Square statistic issignificant atthe10%level.
The average share capital of the three groups had been in-
creasing during the period 1990-92 (Table IV.6). Group I consis-
tently had the lowest average share capital among the three
groups during the indicated period. In 1992, share capital aver-
aged P1.8 million for Group I, _2.7 million for Group II and
_2.6 million for Group III. However, the differences in the
average share capital among these three groups were not statis-
tically significant in all the years considered.
The share capital per member had also been increasing for
all the three groups during the period in review. In 1992, it
averaged _2.9 thousand for Group I, i_4.2 thousand for Group
II and P3.5 thousand for Group III. The differences in the aver-
age share capital per member among the three groups were not
statistically significant.
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Tal_eW.6
ShareCapital (Median)




1. TST-SELA(I) 1,105,929.0 1,452,793.0 1,851,005.0
2. Others (11) 1,757,962,4 2,184,913.2 2,734,459.2
B. W/Oborrowings (111) 1,719,170.7 2,221,967.0 2,602,450.6
It %ofTotalResources
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 46,0* 40.3* 36.1"
2. Others (11) 55,9* 59.1 ° 55.2*
B, WlO borrowings (111) 69.2* 64.7* 63.8*
IK Savings Deposit perMember (P)
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 2,270.5 3,140.3 2,915.0
2. Others (11) 2,205.3 3,205.9 4,164.1
B. W/Oborrowings (111) 2,676.3 3,279.3 3,479.2
*TheChi-Square statistic issignificant atthe10%level.
The proportion of share capital to total resources showed the
degree of the dependence of credit unions on this source of funds.
The results indicated that the three groups were significantly
different in this respect. More specifically, Group III had a signifi-
cantly higher degree of dependence on share capital as a source
of funds than the other two groups. This was to be expected
considering that it had not borrowed funds from external sources.
Groups I and III seemed to have consistently reduced their depen-
clence on this source of funds during the indicated period in
question, whereas Group II did not show any definite pattern.
The results indicated that access to external sources of funds
did not hamper the credit unions' effort to mobilize share capital.
(v) Reserve Funds
Like other financial intermediaries, credit unions also allo-
cated a portion of their profits to reserves to beef up their capital
l
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and to have enough funds against which future losses could be
charged. The reserve funds of credit unions were quite large,
comprising anywhere from 30 to 50 percent of savings deposits,
and had been increasing during the period 1990-92 (Table IV.7).
In 1992, they averaged I"204 thousand for Group I, P321 thou-
sand for Group II and P312 thousand for Group III. The differ-
ences in the average reserve funds among the three groups were
not statistically significant for all the years considered.
On a per member basis, reserve funds were observed to have
also increased during the indicated period. In1992, reserve funds
per member for Groups I, II and III averaged _261, t_392 and
P359, respectively. Also, the differences in the average reserve
funds per member among the three groups were not statistically
significant in all the years under review.
Group III consistently obtained the highest proportion of re-
serve funds to total resources among the three groups during
TableIV.7
Reserve Funds (Median)




1, TST-SELA (I) 58,805,0 119,447,0 203,469.0
2. Others (11) 118,980.2 187,471.7 320,743.0
B, W/Oborrowings (111) 175,919.0 260,668,0 312,204.0
It %ofTotalResources
A. Withborrowings
1, TST-SELA (I) 2.2" 2.9* 3,4*
2. Others(11) 5.1" 4.1" 5.0*
B, W/O borrowings (111) 5.4* 6.0* 6.5*
IE Savings Deposit perMember (P)
A. Withborrowings
1. TST-SELA(I) 148.2 228.0 261,0
2. Others (11) 188.9 320.6 392,3
B. W/Oborrowings (111) 184.8 286.3 358.8
*TheChi-Square statistic issignificant atthe10%level.
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the period under review, followed by Group II. The differences
in the average proportion of reserve funds to total resources
among the three groups were statistically significant. Again, this
was to be expected because Group III had not obtained any
loans to finance its activities.
The general conclusion that seemed to emerge from the re-
sults was that access to external sources of funds had not im-
peded the savings-mobilization efforts of credit unions. There
are several reasons for this. First, the credit programs using credit
unions as conduits stressed their complementary role to the in-
ternal funds generation effort of credit unions by explicitly in-
corporating in the loan conditionalities the savings-generation
program to be implemented by credit conduits. Second, credit
unions had a built-in savings-mobilization program; that is, bor-
rowers were requested to include in their schedule of repayment
a schedule for raising their fixed and savings deposits. Thus, so
long as members borrowed, they were likely to coniinue saving
in their credit union. Third, the interest rates on savings and
time deposits offered by credit unions were higher than those
offered by banks and were tax free.16And lastly, funds bor-
rowed from external sources still formed a small part of the total
resources of credit unions. A large part of the loan portfolio of
credit unions was still financed by internally-generated funds.
All these factors were absent when the earlier special credit
programs were launched by the government and coursed through
banks.
3. Uses of Funds
The loan portfolio of credit unions grew in tandem with the
growth of their total resources. In 1992, it averaged about P4
million for all the three groups, which was at least 60 percent
16. All interest incomes are charged a 20 percent final tax withheld by banks.
Deposits in credit unions are exempted from this.
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higher than that for 1990 (Table W.8). The differences in the
average loan portfolio among the three groups werenot statisti-
cally significant for all the three years.
The average loan per member increased moderately during
the period in review. In 1992, it averaged P6 thousand for Groups
I and II and P_.5 thousand for Group III. The differences in the
'aVerage loan per member among the three groups of credit unions
were also not statistically significant.
Loans comprised between 80 percent and 89 percent of the
total assets of the credit unions. The differences in the average
of the loan portfolio to total proportion assets were statistically
significant only in 1990. More specifically, Group III allocated
more of their resources to loans compared to Groups I and II. In
the next two years, the three groups had more or less the same








1. TST-SELA(I) 2,361,656.0 2,846,895.0 4,230,509.0
2. Others(11) 2,174,030.0 3,105,375.0 4,099,942.2
B. W/O borrowings(111) 2,360,826.0 2,779,173.0 3,871,447.1
II. % ofTotal Resources
A. With borrowings
1. TST-SELA(I) 83.9" 84.6 80.1"
2. Others(11) 80.6* 82.6 83.0"
B. W/O borrowings(111) 88.8" 84.2 84.5"
B. SavingsDepositperMember(P)
A. With borrowings
1. TST-SELA(I) 4,149.2 5,787.1 6,426.0
2. Others (11) 3,150.8 4,655.0 6,287.0
B. WlO borrowings(111) 3,266.9 4,432.9 4,477.0
*The Chi-Square statistic issignificantat the 10% level.
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4. Profitability
The spread thatcredit unions realized from borrowed funds
could be high, thereby raising their profitability. It is to be noted
that credit unions usually deducted the interest on the loans in
advance. The effective interest rate on credit unions hovered
between 16 percent and 18 percent in the last few years. 17 On
the other hand, interest rate on special credit programs was
usually charged on the outstanding balance. In the case of the
TST-SELA, the interest rate was 7 percent per annum; this was
recently revised to 12 percent. Clearly, credit unions can realize
a substantial spread from these sources of funds. It is therefore
hypothesized that credit unions with access to funds from exter-
nal sources had higher profit rates than those without access to
such funds.
Six indicators of profitability are used here (Table IV.9). The
first is the ratio of total expenses to total income of credit unions,
which measures the extent to which credit unions were able to
manage their expenses. The computed ratios of total expenses to
total income generally showed that credit unions were able to
manage well their expenses. Nonetheless, the performances of
the three groups varied. In particular, the average ratios for
Groups I and II rose in 1991, but declined in the subsequent
year. In contrast, those for Group III increased consistently but
only moderately. Despite this, their average ratio of total ex-
penses to total income was significantly lower than those of
Groups I and II in all the years being considered. In 1992, their
total expenses were only about half of their total income com-
pared to two-thirds for the other groups.
The second indicator of profitability is the ratio of interest
income to total assets, which measures the degree to which
credit unions were able to maximize the returns on assets by
investing them in interest-bearing assets. The results show that
17. Credit unions seldom change their lending rates.
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1. TST-SELA(I) 66.7" 82.6* 67.3*
2. Othem (11) 63.0*. 68.6* 67.6*
B. W/O borrowings(111) 50.0* 51.9" 52.2*
II Ratioof InterestIncometoTotalAssets (%)
A, With borrowings
1. TST-$ELA (I) 8.0* 8.1" 1!.1
2. Others(11) 8.6* 7.9 11.0
B. W/O borTowlngs(111) 10.0" 8.9 11.0
IlL Ratioof InterestExpenses toTotal ResourcesOrAssets (%)
A. With borrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 2,3* 2.6* 3.6*
2. Others(11) 1,8" 1.3" 1.6.
B. WlO borrowings(111) 1.1" 1.2" 1.3"
IV. RatioofInterestIncometoTotal income(%)
A. With borrowings
1. TST-SELA(I) 54.2* 52.9 6g.8
2. Others(it) 55.7* 52.7 68.0
B. W/O borrowings 62.4" 50.7 65.6
V. Rate ofReturnonTotal Assets (%)
A. With borrowings
1. TST-SEI.A (I) 4.6* 4.1" 4.7
2. Others(11) 6.4* 5.3 4.5*
B. W/O borrowings(111) 8.3* 7.8* 8.2*
VI. Rate of ReturnonCapital(%)
A, With borrowings
1. TST-SELA (I) 12.0 10.7 9.9
2_ Others(11) 11.1 8.3 8.8
B. W/O borrowings 10.8 11,6 11,4
*The Chi-Square statisticissignificantatthe 10% level.
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Group IIIhad a significantly higher ratio of interest income to
total assets than the other two groups. However, the subsequent
years did not show any significant difference in the average
ratios among the three groups. In 1992, the ratio was 11 per-
cent for'all three groups.
The third indicator is the ratio of interest expense to total
resources, which measures the degree of dependence of credit
unions on interest-bearing funds to finance their activities. Group
I .had significantly higher ratio in all the years considered, fol-
lowed by Group II. On the other hand, Group Ill consistently
showed the lowest ratio. These results were to be expected be-
cause Group I had much higher levels of borrowing than Group
II, while Group III did not have any borrowings at all and
depended largely on share capital.
The fourth indicator is the ratio of Interest income to total
income, which measures the degree of credit unions' depen-
dence on interest-bearing assets for their income. In 1990, the
performances of the three groups were markedly different, with
Group III showing a significantly higher degree of dependence
on interest income. In 1992, the average ratios were no longer
significantly different from each other. What is worth noting,
though, is that the average ratios for Groups I and II markedly
rose between 1990 and 1992 while that of Group [] increased
only slightly. The sharp rise in the degree of dependence of
Groups I and II on Interest income may have been due to the
additional resources they obtah_ed through borrowing that had
been used to expand their loan portfolio.
The fifth indicator is the rate of return on assets or RORA
(i.e., net income divided by total assets) which measures the
overall efficiency of credit unions in managing their assets. The
differences in the average rates of return on assets among the
three groups were statistically significant in all the years being
considered. In particular, Group III consistently obtained the
highest rate of return on assets during the period in review. In
1992, their RORA was almost double those of Groups I and II.
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However, when compared with the RORAs of different types of
private banks (see Table IV.10), it can be said that Groups I and
II had the better time of it.
The last indicator is the rate of return on capital (i.e., net
income divided by share capital plus reserves) which is also
commonly known as the rate of return on investment (ROI). The
ROI measured the overall profitability of the credit unions. The
results showed that the ROIs of the three groups were not sig-
nificantly different from each other during the period in review,
suggesting that access to external sources of funds did not have
any impact on the overall profitability of credit unions. The
ROIs realized by credit unions were on the average as attractive
as the return on Treasury bills.
In summary, the results generally did not support the hy-
pothesis that credit unions with access to funds from external
sources were more profitable than those without such access.
5. Loan Delinquency
Previous special credit programs coursed through the bank-








1986 1.6 0.6 1.7
1987 1.8 0.8 1.3
1988 1.8 1.4 3.5
1989 2.0 1.5 3.0
1990 2.3 2.2 2.9
Source ofBasic Data:Central Bank.
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which was why they eventually collapsed. Present credit pro-
grams coursed through the credit unions could have the same
characteristic. If so, then the loan delinquency of those that have
access to external funds is expected to be higher than that of
those without any external borrowings.
It has always been very difficult to detect the loan delin-
quency of credit unions for some reasons. One is that many
credit unions do not have a good monitoring system for delin-
quent loans. Another is that it is common practice among most
credit unions to automatically iestructure their loans or to ad-
vise the members concerned to restructure their past due loans.
The survey questionnaire asked the sample credit unions to
provide information on the number and amount of past due
loans by age. Less than half the total number of respondents
supplied such information. The rest reported that either they did
not have such information or had no past due loans at all,
which was very dubious. The discussion is therefore limited to
credit unions that furnished reliable information. This consists
of 15 credit unions each from Groups I and III and 11 unions
from Group II.
Table W.11 shows the profile of the past due loans of indi-
vidual creditunions as of 1992.18The past due loan ratio (i.e.,
past due loans/total outstanding loans) averaged 14.0 percent,
12.3 percent, 13.5 percent for Groups I, II and III, respectively.
These were not significantly different from each other, implying
that the three groups had practically the same performance as
far as past due loan ratio was concerned.
A closer look at the age distribution of past due loans, how-
ever, showed that about half of the past due loans of Groups I
and II were more than 12 months old. It is to be noted that the
maturity of most loans of credit unions was only 12 months. In
contrast, only one-third of the past due loans of Group IIIwas
more than 12 months old. Thus, in terms of the intensity of the
past due loan problem, Groups I and II were worse off than
Group III.
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Past Due Loans, 1992
A. TST-SELA (I)
Age Resp. 21 Resp. 65 Resp. 67 Resp. 88 Resp. 97 Resp. 52 Resp. 25 Resp. 11
2-6 Months
Number 11 40 102 8 12 81 54 20
Amount(P) 8,778 674,540 666,240 30,837 116,239 387,562 88,324 227,317
6-12 Months
Number 2 25 125 0 23 29 33 12
Amount{P) 2,550 192,726 922,535 O.O 128,850 76.233 81,454 128,723
Over 12 Months
Number 46 12 0 0 O 109 73 35
Amount (P) 68,878 96,363 O.O 0.0 O.O 156,749 132,583 385,519
Total:
Number 59 77 227 8 35 219 160 67
% ofTotalNo.
of Members 13.1 7.9 1t.9 7.9 5.8 20.9 12 17.0
J
Amount (P) 80,206 963,629 1,588,775 30,837 245,089 620,544 302,361 741,559
% ofTotal
Outstanding
Loans 7.1 16.2 5.9 10.6 6.4 13.2 33.7 15.9TableIV.11(CONTINUF_O)
A. TST-SELA {I)
Age Resp. 7 Remp.10 Resp. 50 Resp. 30 Reap. 58 Resp. t21 Rup. 87 Total
i. i
2-6 Months
Number 482 7 61 0 150 0 7 1035
Amount(P) 2,269,745 42,456 393,768 2,059,056 1,800,000 0.0 38,000 8,802,880
(30.0)
6-12 Months
Number 0 21 10 0 100 212 8 601
Amount(P) 0.0 100,216 43.388 0.0 900,000 2,094,095 44,250 4,715,020
(16.0)
Over 12 Months
Numbe- 0 29 980 0 50 276 11 1621
Amount(P) 0.0 166,915 5,215,079 7,380.129580,1,598,195 87,500 15,887,910 (54.0)
Total:
Number 482 57 1,051 0 300 489 26 3257
% ofTotal
No.of Members 19.3 6.2 10.0 0 18.8 19.8 14.3 13.6
Amount(P) 2,269,745 309,587 5,652,233 9,439,185 3,280,000 3,692,290 169,750 29,385,790
% of Total
Outslandfn9 Loans 10.4 7.0 43.2 30.7 t5.2 22.5 10.0 14.0Tal_eIV.11(CONTINUED)
B. Others(II)
Age Resp. 106 Resp. 34 Resp. 76 Resp. 71 Resp. 9 Resp. 124 Resp. 130
2-6 Months
Number 165 0 0 14 34 21 0
Amount(P) 2,330,732 531,296 0.0 165,222 252,650 132,352 0.0
6-12 Months
Number 91 0 6 3 57 39 0
Amount(P) 1.310,710 369,681 110,745 11.000 421,082 248,810 0.0
Over 12 Monlhs
Number 224 0 145 0 137 154 170
Amount (P) 2,826,272 96,611 1,616,054 0.0 1,010,596 534,655 547,513
Total;,
Number 480 0 153 17 228 214 170
% of Total
No. of Members 14.5 0 11.3 7.1 12.1 37.5 15.9
Amount(P) 6,467,713.0 999,588.0 1,726,799.0 176,222.0 : 1,654,328.0 915,617.0 547,513.0
% ofTotal
Outstanding Loans 13.9 11.0 14.7 10.1 12.0 70.4 7.8TableIV.11(CONTINUED)
B. Others(11)
Age Resp. 48 Resp. 92 Resp. 104 Resp. 78 Total
2-6 Months
Number 127 8 0 36 405
Amount(P) 467,398 180,000 0.0 832,272 4,89t,922
(34.1)
6-12 Months
Number 33 5 0 0 236
Amount(P) 258,531 50,000 0.0 0.0 2,780,559
(19.4)
Over 12 Months
Number 0 4 7 0 841
Amount (P) 0.0 35,000 10,200 0.0 6,678,g01
(48,5)
Total:
Number 160 17 7 36 1482
% ofTotal
No. ofMembers 3,1 11.1 1.5 10.8 10.2
Amount(P) 725,929.0 265,000.0 I0,200.0 832,272,0 14,351,381.0
% of Total
OutstandingLoans 1.5 46.2 0.2 12.0 12.3TableIV11 (CONTINUED)
C. Without borrowings(11t)
I
Age Resp. 126 Resp. 114 Resp. 11t Resp. 115 ' Resp. 70 Reap. 62 Resp. 12 Resp. 18
2-6 Months
Number 0 109 0 15 0 72 0 0
Amount (P) 00 969,232.0 710.030 209,699 00 349,506 00 0.0
6-12 Months
Number 0 225 0 10 7 30 0 0
Amount (P) 0.0 193.846 46.456 113,000 34,371 122,531 0.0 0.0
Over 12 Months
Number 652 110 0 20 29 206 25 28
Amount (P) 2,042,957 69,123 1,002.911 56.732 38,432 476,163 100,000 13,982
Total:
Number 652 444 0 45 36 308 25 28
% ofTotal No
of Members 8.7 12.3 0 7.2 63 46,0 5.6 7.1
Amount (P) 2.042.957 1,232,201 1.579.397 379,431 72.803 948.200 100,000 13,982
% ofTotal
Outstanding
Loans 21.3 11.9 38.5 27.1 3.9 44.3 1.7 0.3TABLEIV.11(CONTINUED)
C. Wtthout borrowinl_slUl) , ,
Age Resp. 8 Resp. 17 Resp. 32 Resp. 28 Resp. 23 Resp. t8 Relp. 83 Total
i
2-6 Months
Number 103 276 0 613 10 20 49 1287
Amount(P) 71,115 482,054 0.0 1,970,350 15,617 80,000 416,314 5,273,917
(41.0)
6-12 Months
Number 112 546 1 126 5 0 106 1268
Amount (P) 204,161 1.124,795 4,469 300,452 7,412 0.0 1,134,406 3,285,899
(26.0)
Over 12 Months
Number 49 26 4 82 20 0 9 1260
Amount(P) 144,112 69,580 15,847 211,752 27,177 0.0 56,010 4,324,778
(33.0)
Total:
Number 254 948 5 821 35 20 164 3795
% ofTotarNo.
ofMembers 18.6 32.1 1.3 88.0 3.7 2.9 6.1 14.8
Amount (P) 419,388 1,676,429 20.316 2,482,554 50,206 60.000 1,606,730 12,884,594
% ofTotal
Outstanding
Loans 5.5 2.5 0.3 29,1 10.5 3.2 8.7 13.5
iEXTERNAL SOURCES OFFUNDS AND CREDIT UNIONS
Within a group, the past due loan ratios varied widely among
credit union members. In Group I, one credit union had a past
due loan ratio of 43 percent, involving loans which were more
than 12 months old. In Group II, one had a past due loan ratio
as high as 70 percent, of which half were more than 12 years
old.
It should be recalled that one of the accreditation criteria of
the TST-SELA Program is that a credit union should have a past
due ratio of not more than 15 percent of the total loan portfolio.
This means that 7 out of the 15 credit unions belonging to Group
I would no longer qualify for the TST-SELA Program. It is, how-
ever, not clear whether such delinquency was associated with
the TST-SELA Program. A check with two credit unions that
borrowed from the TST-SELA Program showed that their loans
financed by TST-SELA funds had a lower delinquency ratio than
their regular loans because borrowers knew that they could al-
ways renew their loans under the Program.
In general, the results seemed to suggest that access to exter-
nal funds did not have an impact on the loan delinqency prob-
lem of credit unions. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that
the past due loan ratios of credit unions were alarmingly high.
Although rural banks and private development banks were worse
off than the credit unions in this regard due to the debt over-
hang they experienced since the 1984-85 economic crisis, they
nevertheless showed some improvements in the recent past (see
Table IV.12). Credit unions need to keep tabs on delinquent
loans.
6. Qualitative Indicators
The credit programs which made use of credit unions as
lending conduits might have effected some qualitative changes
in the credit unions, such as improvements in the organizational
structure, accounting system, reporting system, lending policies,




I I I I I
B_nk 1990 1991 1992
RuralBanks 25.0 23.2 24.1
Commercial Banks 6.8 9.4 5.6
Private Dev.Banks 24.2 25.7 15.6
Specialized Gov't. 12.9 8.4 3.7
Note: n,a.- notavailable
Past DueRatios - Past DueLoans
Since the survey did not gather information that would pro-
vide answers to those issues, the visit to the five credit unions
was used to fill up this gap. This results of our interviews gener-
ally showed that the programs, especially the TST-SELA, did
not cause or encourage any qualitative changes in the opera-
tions of credit unions. This is because, except for the savings
mobilization, the loan covenants of the credit programs did not
include conditionalities that would encourage some qualitative
changes in the credit unions. For example, the requirement that
a credit union borrower must have a past due loan ratio of not
more than 15 percent of the total loans outstanding did not
involve a condition that there be an improvement in the moni-
toring of past due loans to separate out at an earlier stage those
loans with the potential to be repaid from those at risk of being
in default.
The other point that must be stressed is that the credit pro-
grams were built upon the existing practices of credit unions,
unlike the earlier credit programs which introduced new lend-
ing practices or policies. Understandably, there was no effort on
the part of donor agencies to introduce qualitative changes in
the operations of the credit unions.
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Summary and Concluding Remarks
The government recently changed its strategy of delivering
credit to those that have been rationed out by the formal bank-
ing system. As it changed the features of its special credit pro-
grams, such as aligning the interest rates to the market rates of
interest rates, it also began to use informal financial institutions
as lending conduits. Two of these programs, namely, the
DAPCOPO and TST-SELA, catered to the agriculture and
nonagriculture sectors, respectively. Thus far, the repayment
records of these programs (i.e., from lending conduits to the
Programs) have been remarkable.
A subset of the informal financial institutions (which have
recently been used as lending conduits of special credit pro-
grams) is the credit union system. These institutions have been
doing well in terms of mobilizing deposits and allocating credits
to small borrowers rationed out by the banking system even
during periods when the banking system encountered some dif-
ficulties. However, they often faced some resource constraints
which prevented them from satisfying the credit demands of
their members on time. Access to external sources of funds, such
as those of special credit programs, could relax such constraint.
Given the disappointing performance of previous special credit
programs and their unfavorable impacts on the lending con-
duits, it might be worthwhile to examine the effects of the recent
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special credit programs or similar facilities on the performance
of credit unions. This paper has tried to analyze this issue using
a post-test experimental-contzol group design. The sample con-
sisted of 105 credit unions affiliated with two nationwide fed-
erations.
The results generally showed that access to external sources
of funds such as the special credit programs of the government
did not have a significant differential impact on the performance
of credit unions. More specifically, it never undermined the sav-
ings-mobilization efforts of credit unions. One of the reasons is
that, unlike credit programs in the past, these special credit
programs emphasized savings mobilization. Another reason is
that credit unions had a built, in savings-mobilization program
in their lending activities. Access to external sources of funds
also had no significant differential impact on the overall profit-
ability of credit unions as measured by the rate of return on
investment and by the loan delinquency problem.
The banking system is better served when it comes to dealing
with resource constraints because of its access to interbank mar-
kets and to rediscounting windows of the Central Bank and
government_owned financial institutions which still carry spe-
cial credit programs. Credit unions, on the other hand, do not
have access to those facilities. Recently, some federations estab-
lished a liquidity fund facility to facilitate the flow of funds from
surplus credit unions to deficit credit unions. Still, these resources
were very limited. The results seem to suggest that there is merit
in providing credit unions with access to external funds to over-
come their resource constraints.
One may raise the issue of whether credit unions are the
right channels of credit to poor households. The TST-SELA, for
instance, has specified that the final loan beneficiaries should
belong to the low-income group. However, credit union mem-
bers are, on the average, relatively well off than the rest of the
population in the country as pointed out in Chapter IV. It is to
be noted that credit unions do not discriminate between poor
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and rich members when it comes to granting credit because
every bona fide member is given an equal opportunity. Thus, it is
argued that small borrowers will not likely benefit from the loan
programs if they are coursed through the credit unions.
In response to this criticism, perhaps the experience of other
Countries with credit programs for the poor can be cited. The
KUPEDES scheme of Indonesia immediately comes to mind.
KUPEDES is a general credit program for all income classes of
the rural population of Indonesia. Biggs et al. (1991) pointed out
that: "While KUPEDES does not satisfy the Congressional man-
date to establish loan programs targeted on the poor, its impact
on the rural poor is probably greater than that of any more
sharply targeted program." (p. 47)
This can perhaps be said of the TST-SELA and DAPCOPO.
Although these programs target a certain clientele (i.e., TST-
SELA for nonagricultural activities and DAPCOPO for agricul-
tural activities), they nevertheless serve a much wider range of
borrowers within the sector than the previous special credit pro-
grams. And coursing these loans through credit unions widens
further the range of income classes that can benefit from the
program.
Even if members of credit unions are, on the average, rela-
tively well off, a great majority of them do not have access yet to
credit from the formal banking system. The new strategy adopted
for the special credit programs permits loans to be given to those
who, While not having access to credit from the banking system,
have greater chances of success in their business. In our inter-
views with some managers of market vendors' credit unions, we
learned that members who had small businesses employed from
2 to 4 people. Clearly, expansion of their business could lead to
the creation of more job opportunities.
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